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Abstract 
This article critically assesses the role of pro-reform and pro-EU civil society in the process of Serbia’s 
accession to the European Union (EU). Civil society (the so-called non-government or third sector) has 
played a fundamental role in the democratisation of former Communist countries, including in the 
Western Balkans where the majority of aspirant EU members still reside. Serbia’s democratic 
transformation began soon after its regime-change occurred on 5 October 2000. This country’s 
process of democratic consolidation is ongoing and is strongly supported by pro-EU civil society 
actors who are key drivers of Europeanisation. Civil society organisations and actors have increased 
general knowledge about the quality of democratic reforms in Serbia and brought in technical 
expertise which has assisted Serbian society to align better with the EU’s acquis. Specific examples of 
civil society’s activism in this article will demonstrate some unique characteristics of Serbia’s third 
sector. Its evolution from an anti-war movement and loosely connected individuals and citizens’ 
associations in the 1990s to becoming a major advocate of EU membership in Serbia and a partner to 
the Serbian Government on EU accession is worthy of further academic research and analysis.  
Keywords: accession, Serbia-EU relations, civil society, NGOs, European integration 
Introduction 
The model of permanent mobilisation that was demonstrated during the mass 
protests [in Serbia] consists of: active and spontaneous participation of 
individuals and groups, connected by the same ends but not the same 
organisation; reaching of a consensus on the important questions; open 
communication without taboo topics; generalisation of requests so that only 
those requests that are in the public good will withstand; the high level of critical 
thinking towards the leaders; innovation, fast learning, solidarity and a high 
level of care for one’s fellow participants. 
Zoran Đinđić, Borba, 8 August 1997 
 
Pro-reform civil society has been indispensable for Serbia’s democratisation process, 
as ‘part of society that stands opposed to the [established] political structure’ (Gellner, 
1994, p. 56). Its main drivers have been strongly supportive of Serbia’s alignment with 





There are three main roles that civil society has fulfilled since Serbia’s regime-change 
in late 2000: the role of maintaining oppositional political discourses, the watchdog 
role over the government’s performance in key areas of reform, and the role of EU 
advocacy. This paper will examine in detail each of these roles in Serbia’s constantly 
changing political, social and economic climate using the examples of most prominent 
pro-EU civil society actors. These include, but are not limited to, the non-government 
organisations (NGOs) such as the European Movement in Serbia, Civic Initiatives, 
Forum for Ethnic Relations, the Belgrade Fund for Political Excellence and several 
human rights advocacy groups (such as the Belgrade Centre for Human Rights). These 
NGOs have a professionalised workforce, relatively stable budgets and continuity in 
their work with a record of significant achievements.  
As a result of the EU’s political conditionality towards Serbia, its political discourses 
became generally split between the pro-EU and anti-EU camps (Pejic, 2010). Members 
of the latter group have generally advocated adopting either an anti-Western and pro-
Russian stance in foreign policy, or an independent position without any alignment 
with key international actors. Due to this dichotomy and, at times, highly emotive 
debates in mainstream political discourses regarding Serbia’s foreign policy 
orientation, pro-EU civil society has been accused by Serbia’s nationalistic parties and 
anti-EU political groups of being an instrument of ‘soft’ power of the Western 
governments (Informativna Služba Dveri, 2017).  
Since the focus of this paper is on pro-reform NGOs that are highly relevant for Serbia’s 
European integration process, an analysis of anti-EU NGOs will not be covered here. 
For information about that aspect of the Serbian NGO sector, see Kostovicova (2006) 
and Jelena Obradović-Wochnik (2013). This paper will also not offer a chronological 
study of the development of civil society in Serbia or the legislative instruments that 
have facilitated better dialogue between the Serbian Government and civil society 
organisations. It will not specifically examine a comprehensive list of challenges that 
civil society in Serbia continues to face, such as funding issues, which are an important 
characterisation of civil society in most post-communist states. Rather, the focus will 
be on specific roles and functions (with relevant examples) that civil society has 
fulfilled in order to bring Serbia ‘closer to Europe’ and advance this country’s quest for 
EU membership.  
The article will first discuss the concept of civil society. Then, a survey of Serbia’s civil 
society development and a historical background from the 1990s era in Serbian politics 
will assist the reader to better understand the origins of pro-EU civil society activism 
in Serbia. Oppositional politics and a highly politicised nature of Serbia’s civil society 
and discourses that accompany its activities makes Serbian civil society’s experience 
unique in Southeast European politics for several reasons. Although parliamentary 
traditions in Serbia can be traced back to the 19th century, it was the very last country 
in Southeast Europe to topple authoritarianism in 2000, after Croatia (now an EU 
member) in 1999.  
Moreover, pro-Western civil society actors played a specific role during anti-Milosevic 
protests across Serbia in the 1990s and 2000, which culminated in Serbia’s regime 
change. In this aspect, Serbian pro-EU civil society organisations have established a 
mutually supportive relationship with the Western European governments, EU 
institutions and other Western supporters and donors. Civil society groups and 
associations formed during that period also mobilised ordinary citizens into bringing 
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opposition to the autocratic Milosevic regime to the forefront of daily political 
discourses and citizens’ initiatives. This difficult chapter in Serbian politics provided 
the context in which some of the oldest and most active pro-EU civil society actors in 
Serbia were established. Many former NGO and student activists continued to lead 
their own pro-reform NGOs in post-Milosevic Serbia, such as Sonja Biserko (Helsinki 
Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, established in 1994), Sonja Licht (Belgrade 
Fund for Political Excellence, established in 2003-04) and Natasa Kandic 
(Humanitarian Law Centre, established in 1991). Kandic was even nominated for the 
2018 Nobel Peace Prize by US lawmakers. 
In the next section, key areas of civil society’s activism in Serbia after 2001 will be 
discussed. These include efforts to promote reconciliation and peace in the region 
through various initiatives, as case studies will illustrate. Civil society’s watchdog role 
will be also discussed. The focus of this section will be specifically on the pro-EU 
elements of Serbia’s civil society that have played a vital role in promoting freedom of 
speech, human rights and freedom of the press. These NGOs have been conducive to 
the accession negotiations and committed to Serbia becoming a ‘good democratic and 
European citizen’ by spreading the values of social inclusion, tolerance and 
participatory democracy. In Serbia’s context, this has meant fulfilling the criteria for 
EU accession by aligning the country with the EU’s acquis, improving regional 
cooperation with former wartime foes, and fulfilling obligations of international justice 
by extraditing key war crimes suspects to the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia in The Hague. Understanding the historical legacy of Serbia’s civil 
society (as discussed in the section below) is fundamental to our understanding of the 
political challenges which pro-EU civil society’s activists have faced and will continue 
to face in post-Milosevic Serbia.  
Historical legacy of the 1990s era 
Oppositional political discourses, cooperation with political opposition to 
the Milosevic regime and links with the EU and the West 
According to the famed American political scientist and theorist of democratisation 
Robert Dahl, key arenas of democracy include the realm of free and fairly conducted 
elections; universal suffrage and the right to run for public office; responsiveness of 
government and parties to the voters; the guarantee and protection of the freedom of 
expression; the existence and free access to alternative information (not controlled by 
the government); and associational autonomy (Keman, 2018). The right for citizens to 
organise in autonomous associations outside official government institutions is 
supported by the acquis of the European Union, and guaranteed through national legal 
systems of EU members. Article 11 of the Lisbon Treaty stipulates that in the name of 
coherency and transparency, EU institutions ‘shall maintain an open, transparent and 
regular dialogue with representative associations and civil society’, and ‘give citizens 
and representative associations the opportunity to make known and publicly exchange 
their views in all areas of Union action’ (EUR-LEX, 2012). This commitment to civil 
society by the EU makes it an even stronger imperative that EU candidates develop 
required legal protections as well as regulative frameworks that would make the work 
of NGOs safe, supported and truthfully represented.  
Furthermore, as part of the accession negotiations, the European Commission has 





precondition for accession. EU accession is an established political route that all new 
EU members have previously taken. An exception to this rule includes the six founding 
countries that were interlocked in a different type of inter-governmental bargaining in 
post-war Europe in order to create new treaties and mechanisms that laid the EU’s 
foundations as a project for peace. Another exception is the case of East Germany, 
which was the subject of special negotiations and arrangements between West 
Germany, an EU member, and other EU members. The preparation for EU 
membership involves the fulfilment of the EU’s strict accession criteria, for which 
major structural, legislative, normative, economic and social reforms are necessary. In 
the Eastern enlargement of the EU from 2004 to 2007, institutions such as the 
European Commission have played a key role in empowering civil society in acceding 
member states (Parau, 2008). 
The term ‘civil society’ is used here to indicate those associations which bring people 
together to advance a public cause through cooperation (most frequently, but not 
always, in a volunteering capacity) and independently from official government 
institutions, one’s immediate kinship structures and the market (Versteeg, 2011, p. 3). 
This concept is laden with multiple meanings and explanations. It denotes an 
independent, non-profit sector between the government, religious institutions and the 
family, where individuals engage in social and political activism in the pursuit of 
shared goals and objectives. Civil society’s reporting and activism have had an impact 
on Serbia’s accession process due to key pro-EU civil society organisations’ close links 
(and consultative mechanisms) with the European Commission, which were 
incrementally developed during the 1990s era in Serbian politics.  
Civil society in the 1990s and 2000: bringing Serbia back to 
Europe 
Serbia in the 1990s was on the opposite trajectory from the majority of Europe’s post-
communist countries, but it was not the only nation to face a delayed transition 
(Petrovic, 2013, p. 24). While the majority of these countries benefitted from generous 
transition programs (which assisted the growth of their civil society sector), signed 
‘Europe Agreements’, began creating a market economy and commencing preliminary 
accession negotiations, Serbia underwent a period of authoritarianism coinciding with 
a sharp economic decline, dramatic rise in corruption, poverty and hyperinflation — 
the consequences of which are still felt today. As Italian-Serbian political economist 
Milica Uvalic pointedly observed, while anti-communist revolutions in the rest of 
Europe opened the doors to the outside world, Serbian youth were unable to travel or 
study abroad, but ‘have spent their youth participating in demonstrations, living in 
poverty, hounded by the authorities to serve in the army, even arrested or beaten for 
their ‘antistate’ activities’ (Uvalic, 2012, p. 6). Yugoslavia’s isolation amid international 
sanctions also meant it was excluded from financial assistance programs by the EU, 
the World Bank and other multilateral institutions, which have fundamentally 
contributed to the emergence of a market economy and participatory democracy in 
other post-communist states of East Central and South-East Europe. This dire 
political, social and economic climate was one in which Serbia’s pro-EU civil society 
activism was born.  
Serbia in the early 1990s was ruled by the authoritarian regime of Slobodan Milosevic, 
who came to power in 1986 as the regional President of Serbia’s Communist Party. He 
was also the founding President of the Socialist Party of Serbia (established in 1990). 
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Milosevic was elected as the first President of post-communist Serbia from 1991 until 
1997, and as the third President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (which consisted 
of the Serbian and Montenegrin republics) from 1997 to 2000. The nature of his 
domination over Serbian politics has been variously described as ‘autocratic’, 
‘populist’, nepotistic, corrupt, aggressive and coercive (Djukić, 2001). His 
government’s attitude towards pro-EU NGOs was negative and suppressive, with 
official political discourses aiming to discredit them by describing NGOs as foreign 
agents, radical, subversive, anti-nationalist in character and part of a global conspiracy 
against Serbia. This image of pro-EU NGOs acting as an instrument of soft power by 
Western governments has never disappeared from Serbia’s political, academic and 
media scene, indicating a disregard of the value of civil society’s contributions to 
Serbia’s transition from authoritarianism to democracy (Kresovic, 2016). 
Interestingly for the students of protest movements, prior to Yugoslavia’s 
disintegration, Slobodan Milosevic led the so-called ‘anti-bureaucratic’ revolution in 
the late 1980s, which was in fact a series of purges against liberalising tendencies 
across Yugoslavia’s political spectrum. Street protests called ‘Rallies of truth’ by 
Milosevic’s supporters were initiated around the time of pro-independence rallies in 
Kosovo by ethnic Albanians. They were directed against the moves towards greater 
autonomy within Serbia’s provinces of Vojvodina in the North and Kosovo in the 
South. By late 1988, street protests spread to more than thirty towns across Serbia. 
One rally alone in November 1988 in Belgrade gathered several hundred thousand 
people (The Washington Post, 1988). Milosevic then was instrumental in a change of 
government in Montenegro, replacing it with his own political allies. The domestic 
‘success’ of his political project was reflected in Serbia’s constitutional changes, a 
reversal of reforms within the political system, and mass arrests of his political 
opponents. Milosevic would use similar tacticto consolidate his power in Serbia during 
the 1990s and suppress civil society activists using media, propaganda, and security 
services against any alternative vision of Serbia’s political system (Human Rights 
Watch, 2000). 
Anti-Milosevic mass protests in Belgrade organised by the opposition and student organisations on 9 and 11 March 1991 were brutally supressed by the state’s security 
apparatus, which was reported by international media and criticised by leading 
international human rights organisations. Amnesty International noted that several hundred student protestors were arrested. It reported that ‘students who had been 
arrested said that they were taken to a police station and made to run the gauntlet, with police officers beating them with truncheons’ (Amnesty International, 1992, p. 281). Milosevic accused the protesters of being ‘puppets of the West’, and for supporting those who ‘wanted to take back Serbia to a vassal state’, alluding to the Ottoman times 
(Engelberg, 1991). Opposition media sources were gradually suppressed; civil society 
became another casualty of that era due to the clampdown by the Yugoslav authorities. 
Many liberal-minded academics and activists left Yugoslavia as Milosevic was 
cementing his grip on power and in protest to his domestic and regional policies. Key 
opposition leaders, including the nationalist writer turned politician Vuk Draskovic 
and the Western-minded liberal and philosopher also turned politician Zoran Djindjic, 
eventually turned to seeking support outside Serbia for their cause. For the first time 
since socialist Yugoslavia renounced the monarchy in the 1940s, British-born and 
raised Serbian Crown Prince Aleksandar Karađorđević landed in Belgrade to support 





Council, 2018). This was the time when one of the oldest and most influential pro-EU 
organisations in Serbia was established, which, as discussed below, continues to have 
a positive impact on Serbia’s accession negotiations. 
The European Movement in Serbia (Evropski Pokret) was established in November 
1992 as a non-government (NGO), non-partisan and non-profit organisation. In 1993, 
it joined the European Movement International association, which has a long tradition 
of influence and lobbying in European countries with the goal of promoting European 
integration (European Movement International, 2018). The mission of this far 
reaching NGO is to influence public opinion in Serbia and to spread awareness of 
European integration through public campaigns, educational programs, research 
reports, participation in academic, political and social forums and international 
meetings. The organisation supports the vision of a federal Europe, the so-called 
‘United States of Europe’ (Evropski Pokret u Srbiji, 2018a). At the grass-roots level in 
Serbia, this NGO has supported a network of like-minded NGOs for over 25 years. In 
recent times, in order to assist with accelerating accession processes for the remaining 
six polities in the Balkans (which includes Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, 
Montenegro and Serbia alongside Kosovo), the European Movement in Serbia 
supported the creation of a network of civil society organisations from the Balkan 
region in order to intensify lobbying efforts and to improve their image inside the EU 
and thereby lessen opposition to their accession (Radio-Television Serbia, 2016). This 
example of deeper intra-regional cooperation among civil society networks in the 
Balkans is congruent with the EU’s accession conditionality for better regional 
cooperation amongst these prospective members, which will be a topic of discussion in 
the next section of this article.  
The European Movement in Serbia has been the key supporter of many EU-oriented 
initiatives, including education seminars, applied research, academic publications and 
public campaigns aimed at increasing awareness about the European Union in Serbia 
(Evropski Pokret u Srbiji, 2018b). One of its most prominent activities in the field of 
Serbia’s EU accession has been executing the ‘National Convention on European 
Union’ project (established in 2011) in cooperation with the Serbian Parliament, which 
was financed by the EU. The idea behind this project was to create a permanent forum 
for dialogue and knowledge exchanges towards improving Serbia’s capacities to join 
the EU; to monitor legislative reforms and Serbia’s EU accession negotiations through 
thematic expert-led working-groups, and to increase public knowledge of such 
processes through independent analysis and reporting (National Convention on 
European Union, 2014a).  
This NGO has been also active during election times in calling on Serbian citizens to 
use their electoral right and vote for democratic parties and President (Tanjug, 2017). 
It was also a key participant at the roundtable discussions between the Serbian leader 
(formerly Prime Minister and now President) Aleksandar Vucic and pro-EU NGOs on 
the topic of Serbia’s progress in accession negotiations (Telegraf, 2015). The European 
Movement in Serbia has consistently been a positive force for Serbia’s EU accession, 
pushing for the values which would help Serbia to become more democratic, inclusive 
and tolerant as a state and society. However, Serbia’s place in Europe during the times 
of crisis and transformation, including during its transition from communism to 
autocracy in the early 1990s and later to democracy after 2000 has been the subject of 
ongoing academic and policy discussions. Anti-democratic forces in Serbia have 
presented serious obstacles to the work of Serbian pro-EU civil society actors over the 
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years, and will continue to do so as long as the official sanctioning of their actions is 
not severe enough. 
Serbia’s civil society building rapport with the West: the 
emergence of OTPOR 
As a result of its involvement in the violent dismemberment of socialist Yugoslavia, 
which was Europe’s bloodiest conflict since the Second World War, Serbia under 
Milosevic became a pariah state and a subject of international sanctions and additional 
European punitive measures. During that period, civil society played a pseudo-
diplomatic role, bridging Serbia’s isolation and reaching out to the European Union as 
an independent actor at the time of most intense pressure put by the West on Serbia, 
which was under international sanctions (Lopandić and Minić, 2000, p. 75). One such 
example was the civil society-led protests of 1996-97 and the protests of 1999 and 
2000. They helped bring Serbia closer to Europe politically as links between Serbia’s 
civil society, opposition political parties and student groups were formed. This period 
of civil society’s activism will be discussed in the section below. 
The role of maintaining oppositional discourses and supporting political opposition in 
Serbia and Montenegro was a key area of activism for Serbian pro-EU NGOs in the mid 
to late 1990s. For some of them, links with the West already existed, as they had been 
established with support from overseas donors (such as the European Movement in 
Serbia). The Pro-EU Civic Initiatives (Gradjanske Inicijative) association was 
established in 1996 by a number of ‘prominent civil society activists who were involved 
in Serbia’s anti-war movement and anti-nationalistic democratic opposition’; their 
method of supporting democratic reforms has been through civic education about 
citizen rights, democracy, activism and volunteering (Civic Initiatives, 2018). A 
mission of this NGO, which has become one of the most prominent pro-EU NGOs in 
the region, is to spread civic and democratic values such as tolerance, solidarity, equal 
opportunities for all and life-long education. Currently, their two main initiatives 
include programs for improving capacities of Serbia’s civil society and a public policy 
program.  
At the time of its founding, Civic Initiatives became a discussion forum and a vehicle 
of dissent, bringing together writers, academics, artists and opposition figures who 
opposed the Milosevic regime. Its de-facto leader and director from 1996 until 2014 
was Miljenko Dereta, a prominent film-maker who once stood as an opposition 
candidate for the Serbian Parliament in the first post-Communist and multi-party 
elections in 1990 (Civic Initiatives, 2016). The climate in which Civic Initiatives was 
formed was one of political tension as the Milosevic regime was readying for local and 
federal parliamentary elections, the outcome of which sparked the largest protest in 
the history of student-movements in the region.  
The results of the local elections in Serbia, which were held in two rounds in November 
1996, demonstrated a strong support for opposition candidates in large cities such as 
Belgrade (capital), Kragujevac and Nis. In the first round of elections, for example, 
democratic opposition called ‘Together’ won 70 out of 110 seats in Belgrade. However, 
the ruling party annulled these results by exerting political pressure on the courts and 
electoral commission, and a new round of elections was called (Goati, 2001, pp. 74-77). 
Pro-democracy NGOs condemned the blatant disregard of Serbia’s constitutional laws. 





independent electoral observers at many polling stations across Serbia set off the 
largest wave of citizen protests of the 1990s in that region; the protests lasted from 
November 1996 to March 1997. They were principally led by student organisations, and 
involved representatives from opposition political parties, academics, writers, artists, 
lawyers and public servants. They were strongly supported by Serbia’s civil society 
sector and pro-EU NGOs which were collectively advocating for a regime-change 
through peaceful means.  
According to a Serbian law professor Dragica Vujadinovic, the aims of Serbia’s mass 
protests were two-fold. Firstly, they were a demonstration of civil disobedience and a 
nation-wide revolt against electoral fraud and the Milosevic regime more broadly. 
Secondly, it was an unequivocal call by the students and civil society actors for the 
establishment of a ‘normal, modern state and society, for the change of (an entire 
political, social and economic) system, and for a radical change of the media 
environment and political culture’ in Serbia (Vujadinović, 2009, p. 2001). In 1998, 
Vujadinovic was one of the founders of the Alternative Academic Education Network 
(AAEN), an NGO based in Belgrade. This NGO was established in protest against new 
government regulations restricting academic freedoms, firing academic workers 
because of their pro-democratic views and which censored and severely curtailed 
independent research (Human Rights Watch, 1998). More specifically, the main aim 
of this network was to provide an alternative educational pathway to students and 
junior academics and to lay the groundwork for university reform. It received support 
from the Council of Europe, the Association of European Universities, World 
Universities, Austria and Germany (Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, 2003, p. 394). 
The student protest wave of the 1996-97 was halted after the Milosevic regime 
nominally met some of the protesters’ demands. However, this was short-lived as new 
draconian laws were introduced that restricted the freedom of speech and press as well 
as academic freedoms, especially those introduced in May 1998 (Radio Free Europe, 
1999). AAEN then became increasingly popular amongst pro-democracy students and 
academics as it provided a forum for discussion of European laws, values and 
institutional practices as well as democratic processes more generally – all topics that 
were restricted by the Serbian Government. Civil society associations like AAEN were 
the primary vehicle during those turbulent times for educating the Serbian public 
about the EU, thereby also fulfilling the very important role of de facto EU advocacy. 
Despite the fact that the 1996-97 protests did not result in a regime-change, civil 
society’s activism against the authoritarian government substantially increased. A new 
organisation called Otpor (meaning ‘Resistance’ in English) established in October 
1998, emerged as a herald of civil society’s activism (Nikolayenko, 2013, p. 147). 
Otpor’s organisers (the most prominent being Ivan Marovic and Srdja Popovic) 
obtained support and training through USAID, the National Endowment for 
Democracy (NED) and gathered political support from other Western governments 
(Brandt, 2011). Albert Cevallos from the US Institute of Peace wrote that by 2000, U.S. 
assistance to Otpor and other pro-democracy groups in Serbia was around $25 million 
(Cevallos, 2001, p. 5). 
Otpor had a unique organisational structure as it did not feature a single leader, who 
could have been easily targeted (and possibly silenced) by government agencies, but a 
horizontal network of activists all across Serbia (Sombutpoonsiri, 2012). It also 
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received support from Serbia’s student networks abroad, in particular the European 
and U.S. branches of the Organization of Serbian Students Abroad (Organizacija 
Srpskih Studenata u Inostranstvu ( OSSI)), which was an NGO that was lobbying 
Western governments to back the civil society’s-led goal of peaceful regime-change in 
Serbia. This NGO which had branches world-wide (and which included a Harvard 
student, Vuk Jeremic, who later became Serbia’s Foreign Minister in a pro-EU, 
democratic government), was formed in mid-1997 in solidarity with Serbian students 
who led the 1996-97 mass protests (Kulish, 2010).  
As Otpor’s membership base grew (from an urban student group to a national 
movement), its links with the international aid community also expanded. Kuzio 
observed that the training of civil society organisations and youth movements in 
Serbia, which was undertaken with Western technical and financial assistance, formed 
part of the success ‘recipe’ for Serbia’s regime-change (Kuzio, 2006). Spierri estimates 
that Otpor received some $390,000 in funding from USAID, NED and the 
International Republican Institute (IRI) to open over twenty offices across Serbia, train 
activists and pay for the publication of printed material that was widely distributed 
(Spoerri, 2015, p. 87). OSSI specifically supported Serbia’s regime-change by sending 
telecommunications equipment from abroad to activists in Serbia, where mobile and 
satellite phone technology was difficult to access and replace once confiscated by the 
security services (Markovic, 2014, p. 220). 
In light of these new activities in the field of civil society’s activism in Serbia, the 
European Commission, alongside other European institutional and state actors, 
decided to more actively lend the EU’s support to democracy promotion in Serbia. By 
then the European Parliament had already established the European Initiative for 
Human Rights and Democracy, a world-wide program to support civil society 
development and vulnerable groups, and to address ‘differentiated human rights and 
democracy objectives at international and national level’ (EU Delegation in Serbia, 
2018). The programs ‘generally had to be implemented in partnership with NGOs and 
international organisations’, which was made easier for Serbian civil society once 
Otpor was formally organised (EUR LEX, 2007). The European Commission therefore 
supported democratic reforms in Serbia separately from the United States-led efforts 
to strengthen civil society in Serbia through programs that contributed to the 
emergence and maintenance of OTPOR’s activities. 
A consensus to oust Milosevic in the West and among Serbian opposition parties and 
political groups after Otpor’s emergence brought a lot of attention to pro-democracy 
efforts and initiatives in Serbiat providing the foundation for the development of many 
pro-EU NGOs after the revolution on 5 October 2000. According to some estimates, 
there were over 2,000 civil society organisations registered in Serbia in 2001, with 
their numbers soaring to over 15,000 only a decade later (Media Centre Belgrade, 
2011). In June 2000, the European Council’s Presidency provided an unequivocal 
statement which demonstrates the link between Serbia’s civil society and the EU’s 
support for change:  
The European Council supports the civil society initiatives as well as the 
democratic forces in Serbia in their struggle to achieve this goal [of EU 
accession] and urges them to stay united and reinforce their cooperation. 





Protests in Serbia against Milosevic restarted on a daily basis in September 2000, and 
on 29-30 September many protesters and members of the Alliance for Change were 
brutalised by the police (Belgrade City Council, 2018). Citizen dissent culminated with 
a mass revolt after Milosevic did not concede his presidential electoral defeat. It led to 
a negotiated regime change on 5 October 2000 between the Serbian opposition and 
security forces, with Milosevic finally stepping down. Opposition’ candidate Vojislav 
Kostunica, a moderate nationalist who had effectively won the elections, became 
Serbia’s President and took Serbia (as part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) back 
into the United Nations on 31 October (United Nations, 2000). Democratic parties won 
a landslide victory in the December 2000 parliamentary elections, which was hailed 
internationally as a new era for the Balkans. This ushered in a fresh start in the 
relations between the EU and Serbia, as well as between the Serbian Government and 
pro-EU civil society, whose numbers and networks grew exponentially in Serbia as the 
next section will discuss.  
 The EU’s ties to the Serbian opposition, to civil society, and with Serbia’s first 
democratic government of Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic that was formed in early 
2001have been instrumental for the reestablishment of positive EU-Serbia relations 
after the regime change d. In June 2002 in Belgrade, at the opening of the Second 
International Convention of NGOs from Central Europe, ex-Soviet area and Turkey, 
the Prime Minister thanked civil society for their important role that had contributed 
to Serbia’s regime change on 5 October 2000, further noting that the advancement of 
civil society in Serbia was ‘a precondition and the goal’ of any further economic 
development (Beta, 2002). Djindjic, who was a champion of democracy, Serbia’s 
return to Europe and speedy EU membership, was assassinated only two years later, 
following his decision to send Milosevic to the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia in The Hague despite the Serbian President’s public dissent (British 
Broadcasting Corporation, 2001). It was a chilling reminder to all pro-EU groups and 
NGOs in Serbia that their struggle for recognition and democratic reform may be far 
from over. 
Profile and main activities of civil society in post-Milosevic Serbia  
Since Serbia’s regime-change, the European Union has been the most active promoter 
of democracy and civil society’s development in this country, recognising that only a 
holistic approach to democratic transformation can bring about true democratic 
reforms, by the government from ‘above’ and from ‘below’ by civil society acting as a 
monitor and watchdog of the government’s performance in key areas of reform. Non-
holistic method involves investing only in reforming the so-called procedural aspects 
of democracy, which includes political parties, electoral politics and the reform of 
government institutions. However, this is inadequate as transformation from below 
must include grassroots-level groups and organisations. This can only be achieved 
through a complementary approach that includes civil society’s development and 
sustainability. Other partners of the EU in this ‘mission’ include individual aid and 
development agencies of member states (in particular Germany and Sweden), non-EU 
countries such as Switzerland and Norway, as well as international organisations (such 
as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the World Bank) and 
government bodies such as the United States’ overseas development assistance agency, 
USAID. Collectively, these donors have provided millions in funding assistance for 
various democratisation initiatives, amongst which were also funds for the 
development of civil society organisations, capability, training and networks. It was 
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crucially important for donors and established NGOs to raise awareness about the 
importance of civil society for Serbia’s reforms, because in many post-Communist 
countries, citizens were frequently shying away from volunteerism as a result of past 
forced membership of the Communist party and many of its organisations. 
Romanian scholars Bogdan Voicu and Malina Voicu have found that being from an ex-
communist country ‘has a negative impact on the level of volunteering.’ However, they 
also found that Westernisation because of European integration processes and 
democratisation have opened up new avenues for volunteering in Europe’s former 
Communist states, bringing a ‘revival of the associative life’. As a result, there have 
been increasing trends of volunteering in the majority of those countries after the first 
decade of democratic transition (Voicu and Voicu, 2009, p. 540). Serbia exhibits a 
similar trend, with a majority of pro-reform NGOs being formed after 2000, with an 
increasing trend particularly noted after 2010 -- as will be discussed in more detail 
below (Gradjanske Inicijative, 2017). 
Mapping the NGO sector in Serbia 
It is difficult to quantify the total external investment in NGO development in Serbia, 
as there was no single institution or method responsible for distributing those funds 
for the development of civil society specifically. As a recipient of international post-
conflict reconstruction and development funds, Serbia received some EUR 8.9 billion 
between 2001 and 2012 in international ODA, with an annual funding of 
approximately EUR 800 million. The actual annual allocations varied as a result of 
global economic climate and domestic conditions, with an average of EUR 275 million 
per year after 2012 until 2017 (Gradjanske Inicijative, 2017, p. 3). This indicated a 
trend of phasing out of donor assistance to Serbia after 2012, but this seemed to have 
little effect on the increasing number of NGOs in Serbia after 2010.  
As a result of increased donor engagement and interest in Serbia after 2000, the 
number of NGOs flourished. As of May 2017, there were ‘29,926 associations, 68 
foreign associations, 761 endowments and foundations and 25 foreign endowments 
and foundations branch offices’ registered in Serbia, according to the Serbian Business 
Registers Agency. The majority of these entities (72 per cent) were formed after 2000 
(of which 43 per cent were formed after 2010), 10 per cent were established between 
1990 and 2000, and 18 per cent before 1989. The NGO sector employed around 6,600 
people in Serbia on a full-time basis in 2014, with at least double that number further 
being employed on a part-time or contract basis (Gradjanske Inicijative, 2017, p. 11-
12). The majority of full-time employees are highly skilled. NGOs in Serbia are mostly 
concentrated in larger urban areas, with capital Belgrade and the Vojvodina district 
being home to some 64 per cent of the total number of NGOs. Around one quarter has 
been involved in some form of international cooperation. The majority of NGOs which 
receive sustained overseas donor assistance are predominantly involved in Project-
based work, resulting in a high degree of specialisation and even advisory capacity of 
some NGOs vis-à-vis the Serbian government (such as the Belgrade Fund for Political 
Excellence).  
The regulatory environment in which civil society has been operating also gradually 
improved as Serbia progressed along its path of democratic reform. After many years 
in the making, the Serbian Government established the Office for Cooperation with 





to work closely with the European Integration Office (established in 2004). While there 
are many areas of reform still needed for Serbia’s civil society to be strengthened 
further (for example with incentives through tax concessions for donations towards 
civil society organisations), the Serbian Government is today a major donor to civil 
society organisations, with its annual funding exceeding 3 million euros. For example, 
in 2012, the Serbian Government provided around 9 million euros to civil society, more 
than double the amount of the previous year (Office for Cooperation with Civil Society, 
2014, pp. 18-19). Since November 2012, the Office for Cooperation with Civil Society 
received a boost in funding from the European Union, which could partially explain 
this substantial increase (Office for Cooperation with Civil Society 2014: 22). Civic 
Initiatives NGO has been, for instance, amongst the largest recipients of the 
government’s assistance, receiving some EUR 1 million in total funding from 2006 
until 2014 (Popadic, 2015). 
After 2009 when Serbia official applied for EU membership key areas of of NGO 
activity were addressed. They included topics such as the dialogue between the Serbian 
Government and NGO sector, promotion of good neighbourly relations, protection of 
media freedoms, urging resolution of the Kosovo issue and the promotion of human 
and minority rights (Wunsch, 2015, p. 454). Some of these areas of activity will be 
specifically discussed in the next sections as illustrative examples of civil society’s 
contributions to Serbia’s EU accession after Milosevic.  
The Serbian Government’s dialogue with civil society: the case of 
the annual Belgrade Security Forum  
After 2000, several prominent pro-EU organisations became highly professionalised, 
skilled workspaces also attracting Serbian diaspora and Serbian students educated 
overseas. Some of the oldest and most outspoken of these organisations contribute to 
Serbia’s accession process by organising high-profile annual forums that probe various 
aspects of Serbia-EU relations, while also observing and reporting on the nature and 
quality of democratic reforms in Serbia (a ‘watchdog’ role). A useful example is the 
annual Belgrade Security Forum (BSF), which has emerged as a key dialogue space 
between academics, policy-makers, public servants and civil society organisations 
(Belgrade Security Forum, 2018). This event, which attracts more than 500 
participants, is organised by a number of prominent Belgrade-based pro-EU civil 
society organisations with support from external donors. Most prominent NGO donors 
include the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (founded in 1997), the European 
Movement in Serbia (founded in 1992), and the Belgrade Fund for Political Excellence 
(founded in 2003). BSF has become one of the most prominent regional forums 
dealing with security issues, European accession and challenges to democracy in the 
region and Europe more broadly.  
In 2016, the sixth BSF is remembered because of a direct encounter in a forum between 
the Prime Ministers of Serbia and Albania, Aleksandar Vucic (now President of Serbia) 
and Edi Rama respectively, which was moderated by British Balkan specialist Misha 
Glenny. Serbian NGOs, in particular the Belgrade Fund for Political Excellence, 
initiated this meeting. It took place during a time of high tensions between Serbia and 
Kosovo, which has close diplomatic and political relations with Albania. According to 
Sonja Licht, founder and President of the Belgrade Fund for Political Excellence, the 
way in which the Vucic-Rama’s dialogue was being conducted represented a step ahead 
for the entire Balkan region, which is characterised ‘not only as a space for conflict but 
Markovic Khaze, ANZJES 10(3) 
 
36 
also as a space with a lack of ability to conduct dialogue’ (Gace and Jovanovic, 2016). 
Licht observed that Vucic and Rama engaged in a frank and open discussion at the BSF 
as they responded in an intelligent way to each other’s arguments (despite having 
opposing views on almost every major regional issue). Following the end of the forum, 
both leaders were able to continue their dialogue in the town of Nis and have an official 
government-to-government meeting, a direct result of their encounter at the BSF.  
The annual BSF is, therefore, an example of how civil society’s activism and inter-NGO 
cooperation in Serbia has contributed to the establishment of a regular dialogue 
mechanism between Serbian pro-reform civil society and government institutions on 
the topic of regional and global challenges to Serbia’s EU accession. It has also made 
some breakthroughs in Serbia’s relations with its neighbours, as this prestigious forum 
provides a ‘safe space’ where second-track dialogue can take place in an honest 
atmosphere between equals and in a non-prejudiced way. Civil society’s specific role 
as a watchdog in overseeing Serbia’s relations with its neighbours, especially those with 
which bilateral issues emerged, will be discussed next. 
Regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations as a 
precondition for accession: civil society’s role 
According to the European Commission, one of the key prerequisites for EU 
membership is the adoption of EU value-system, which inter alia includes the 
promotion, fostering and maintenance of ‘good neighbourly relations’. This criterion 
was set up specifically for the countries in Southeast Europe, the former Yugoslavia 
and Albania (sometimes collectively referred to as the ‘Western Balkans’) under the 
Stabilisation and Association process (SAP). The EU adopted SAP in June 1999 as ‘a 
framework promoting peace, stability, freedom and economic prosperity’ (European 
Commission, 2016) confirming it further at the Thessaloniki summit in 2003 as the 
principal policy mechanism towards this region, the countries of which could expect to 
the EU (see the Introduction to this issue). Shortly after its reaffirmation in 2003, SAP 
was seen in academic circles as an unequivocal sign of the EU’s long-term objective to 
expand south-eastwards in the future (Pippan, 2004, p. 220). 
Against the backdrop of the SAP’s introduction and in the context of historical changes 
in Serbia with the regime-change taking place in October 2000, over one hundred civil 
society organisations met in Zagreb a month later. They discussed how best to advance 
the common goal of regional cooperation between Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Serbia and Montenegro within rump Yugoslavia. This was the first major regional 
attempt to open up frank discussions about the re-start of political, economic and 
cultural cooperation between these three former wartime foes, which all individually 
sought the EU as their principal foreign policy and trade partner. At the second session 
of this conference the following year in Novi Sad, a so-called umbrella of the Igman 
Initiative was established with four coordinating centres (Igman Initiative, 2018a). For 
Serbia, the civil society association responsible for coordination, confidence-building 
measures and advocacy was the Centre for Regionalism, originally founded in 1998 to 
deal with issues such as local government reform, democratisation, minority rights and 
regional integration. 
The Centre for Regionalism, as part of its work within the Igman Initiative, was 
involved in research and lobbying activities on the topic of the 20th anniversary of the 





the Centre for Regionalism as the coordinating body for Serbian NGOs and experts, 
were engaged in opening the dialogue on some key outstanding questions following the 
conclusion of the Dayton Peace Accords (such as the decentralisation of Bosnia-
Herzegovina as a ‘precondition for regional peace and stability’) (Centre for 
Regionalism, 2016). They successfully lobbied national governments and relevant 
ministries to get involved in their work. For example, the EU’s Enlargement 
Department tasked the Igman Initiative to implement a project which was to find 
recommendations for practical solutions to citizens’ status and outstanding property 
issues in the signatory states to the Dayton Agreement. They lobbied national 
governments and got experts from relevant ministries in all four countries to be closely 
involved in research and policy recommendations components of this project (Igman 
Initiative, 2018b). The Igman Initiative’s civil society efforts also focused on improving 
the EU accession process across the region, in particular following Croatia’s successful 
accession in July 2013.  
In Serbia, the Centre for Regionalism implemented further important initiatives some 
connected to the Igman Initiative’s goals but also stand-alone projects, which were 
financed either by EU agencies or larger civil society organisations, all of which are 
listed on their website (Centre for Regionalism, no date). These projects included the 
establishment of a dialogue mechanism with civil society organisations from Kosovo 
to promote good neighbourly relations, and research and lobbying efforts involving 
Roma people (which was at times a topic of contention between Serbia and the 
European Union). A key project on Kosovo included monitoring of an agreement 
between Belgrade and Pristina on the free movement of goods and people in the 
context of regional cooperation (Centre for Regionalism, 2013). In terms of advocacy 
for the Roma people, the Centre for Regionalism as part of the Igman Initiative has 
advocated and lobbied for the Serbian Government to recognise the special needs of 
the internally-displaced Roma people as a special category of displacement. This NGOs 
is involved in the Igman Initiative’s civil monitoring of rights and interests of the Roma 
people across Serbia, including their representation to the Serbian Government and 
regional bodies (Centre for Regionalism, 2015). The Roma people are characterised as 
a special vulnerable category who often lack personal documentation and access to 
clean and safe living conditions. As the Igman Initiative aims to promote the EU’s 
national integration guidelines for inclusion of the Roma people, the Centre for 
Regionalism in Serbia has been an indispensable local implementing body of this 
framework, aimed at changing and improving regional relations towards the common 
goal of EU accession for all remaining candidates in Southeast Europe (European 
Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2018).  
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Civil society as a forum for resolution of bilateral issues with EU 
members 
Since the wars of the Yugoslav disintegration in the 1990s, there has been an increasing 
trend of internationalising Serbia’s domestic issues and of nationalising Serbian 
foreign policy, which is also evident through the work of civil society organisations. 
This means that issues that would traditionally be excluded from the mainstream 
European accession processes, or resolved in a bilateral setting have presented serious 
obstacles to or delays in Serbia’s accession. One such issue occurred in 2013, when a 
bilateral issue between Serbia and Lithuania regarding a position of a Lithuanian 
business entity in Serbia delayed Serbia’s association agreement with the EU (Čpajak, 
2012). Since the 1990s, Romania has repeatedly questioned the position of a Romanian 
minority in Serbia, the Vlachs (who are also divided amongst themselves whether they 
are affiliated with Romania or a stand-alone ethnic group). Romania does not 
recognise the existence of a separate Vlach community and language, considering it a 
variant of Romanian. Serbia, however, regards Vlachs as a distinct entity, as 35 339 
Serbian residents in the 2011 Census identified specifically as Vlachs whereas 29 332 
residents identified as Romanian (Čotrić, 2015). 
In 2012, Romania delayed giving Serbia an EU candidacy status because of the Vlach 
question, causing sharp criticism by other EU member states, in particular from 
Germany (Tanjug, 2012). Pro-EU NGOs in Serbia have been, since this incident, more 
active on this front in order to contribute through informal diplomacy (the so-called 
second track diplomacy), applied research and dialogue process to the resolution of 
such contentious issues. In mid-2016, the Forum for Ethnic Relations, which has 
existed for over thirty years, organised a roundtable on Serbian-Romanian relations, 
Serbia’s EU accession and the position of a Romanian ethnic minority in Serbia, with 
selected participants and representatives, inviting both Vlach and Romanian 
representatives (Forum for Ethnic Relations, 2016). As a background, this NGO was 
formed by European and North American academics in 1989, but registered formally 
as an NGO in Belgrade in 1991; it was anti-war, anti-nationalist and multicultural in 
character. Their Serbian-Romanian roundtable in mid-2016 was one of four such 
encounters organised with support from the Embassy of the United Kingdom in Serbia 
and the Foundation for an Open Society, each of which focused on improving bilateral 
relations between Serbia and its neighbours (Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia and 
Hungary), resolving ethnic minority questions and speeding up Serbia’s EU accession. 
Its ongoing monitoring work in these thematic areas has provided a unique avenue for 
further dialogue, confidence-building measures and discussion which did not exist 
before in such a format between Serbia and its EU neighbours.  
Another NGO, the International and Security Affairs Centre (ISAC) Fund, contributed 
to the ongoing monitoring of this issue through applied research. It published a 
comprehensive, chronological study of Serbia-Romania relations since the early 20th 
century, which was supported by the funds provided by the Royal Norwegian embassy. 
The study offers a detailed list of recommendations to the Serbian Government on 
required legislative and other changes that could further improve inter- and intra-
ethnic relations between Romanian and Vlach communities. It also specifically urges 
the Romanian Government not to use the EU accession process to exert pressure on 
Serbia on issues that are of a strictly bilateral nature (ISAC Fund, 2015, p. 49). This 
NGO also published a policy-oriented research paper, which puts into a wider 





between an EU member and a non-EU member can seriously weaken, threaten or delay 
accession for EU candidates (Novakovic and Djurdjevic, 2015).  
The watchdog of LGBT rights 
In the Serbian case of EU accession, a notable example of the area of human rights 
where civil society has played a crucial role is the advancement and a watchdog of 
rights for the LGBT community (Bilic, 2016). After Serbia’s regime-change, the attempt 
to hold the ‘first Yugoslav gay parade’ was quashed by representatives from far-right 
organisations in Serbia (B92, 2001). Democratic Serbia came under international 
spotlight for a Pride parade going disastrously wrong in June 2001. Taking place after 
a major national soccer match, football hooligans attacked the Pride parade guarded 
by security forces, with many participants, journalists and members of the police force 
sustaining significant injuries. As a consequence, the Serbian Government was 
reluctant to allow the Pride Parade to take place for a number of years. As an expression 
of solidarity, EU Ambassador to Serbia Vincent Degart personally spoke at the opening 
of the next parade, which took place in 2010. He was supported by other members of 
the EU’s diplomatic community in Serbia (Associated Press, 2010). The pride parade 
was again banned in 2011 by Serbia’s National Security Council, which was reported 
on with regret by the European Parliament’s Intergroup on LGBT rights. The European 
Parliament stated at the time that ‘the European Parliament will take note of [that] 
weekend’s events in its upcoming accession report for Serbia, planned for early 2012’ 
(The European Parliament’s Intergroup on LGBT rights 2011). From 2014 onwards, 
the Pride parade was successfully held in Serbia every year (Gould and Moe, 2015). 
This topic always resurfaces in the European Union’s annual reports on Serbia’s 
accession (Ejdus and Bozovic, 2016). 
An activist lesbian association Labris has, since 1995, fulfilled the role of civil society’s 
advocacy on social inclusion of LGBT people primarily through public education 
campaigns and watchdog activities. Labris started as a lesbian newspaper in 1995, 
evolving to a major national LGBT rights advocacy group. In 2015-16, they found that 
at least nine major school textbooks (many of which were over 30 years old and still in 
use) had material which was offensive to the LGBT community. Following this finding, 
they lobbied Serbia’s Education Ministry to remove such material from textbooks. So 
far, some of these textbooks have been altered in response to this public campaign. 
Labris also noted that while Serbia nowadays has many laws that guarantee the rights 
of the LGBT community, the political will and capacity to change things in practice is 
much slower (Labris, 2017). In 2017, Labris and other LGBT activists welcomed as a 
historic move the unexpected decision by a rather conservative politician, President 
Aleksandar Vucic, to appoint as Serbia’s Prime Minister an openly lesbian person (Gej 
Strejt Alijansa, 2016). Ana Brnabic, a political newcomer, was first appointed as a 
Minister in the Vucic Government in 2016, making history for the LGBT community in 
Serbia. She was the first lesbian Prime Minister in the region to ever be appointed. 
Alongside other activist associations, Labris contributed to the formation of a 
monitoring mechanism for reporting hate crimes and attacks against members of the 
LGBT community in Serbia, as reported to the European Commission in the context of 
Serbia’s accession progress report (ILGA-Europe, 2016).  
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Protection of freedom of speech and EU advocacy role 
A key task for Serbia’s civil society has been the dissemination of factual information 
about the EU, whose image was tarnished during many years of authoritarianism and 
the Milosevic-era propaganda machinery (National Convention on European Union, 
2014b). In May 2008, for instance, nationalist posters were placed in Belgrade 
opposing Serbia’s then President Boris Tadic and the Serbian Government for having 
signed the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) on a closer relationship with 
the EU (Pejic, 2010). There arealso recorded cases where the so-called pro-patriotic 
NGOs (sometimes bordering on being extremist right or leftist groups such as Group 
1389), directly lobbied against Serbia’s EU orientation through anti-EU public 
campaigns and by labelling pro-EU NGOs as anti-Serbian and foreign agents, and even 
by physically threatening the staff working for these NGOs, pro-Western journalists 
and political commentators (Zivanovic, 2017). This ‘uncivil’ side of civil society in 
Serbia has not been discussed here at length, but it is important to factor it in when 
discussing obstacles to Serbia’s EU accession and the work of civil society towards this 
goal (Cabric, 2013). Civil society in Serbia has been a counter-force to those negative, 
anti-democratic and populist forces (that are also strongly anti-EU in character) by 
further advancing a liberal democratic agenda and promoting civic values of tolerance 
and inclusion (Markovic, 2012, p. 47). 
In October 2017, more than 200 civil society organisations and media outlets 
supported a petition against ‘darkness of the media’ in Serbia. They highlighted the 
important role of independent media in democratic societies, and advocated for more 
transparency and media freedoms in Serbia which they claim had been seriously 
eroded (The Network of the Committees of Human Rights in Serbia, 2017). According 
to Freedom House reports, Serbia’s press freedom worsened over the past decade as a 
result of slow implementation of legal protections and the enactment of new 
regulations which have increased government control over the media (Freedom House, 
2018). The European Commission, in its latest progress report on Serbia, has also 
highlighted that Serbia needs to improve in the area of media and press freedoms such 
as by improving monitoring of broadcasters, adopting legislation of cyber security and 
media literacy as part of the education system more broadly (European Commission, 
2018a). In this sense, civil society has been very active, but the Serbian Government 
has been slow to respond to recommendations and policy reports, the consequences of 
which are felt in criticisms of this issue world-wide, including from UN officials (Balkan 
Insight, 2017).  
Conclusions 
This paper has examined the multiple roles that civil society actors in Serbia have 
played in the process of this country’s democratic transition from authoritarianism to 
democracy. These roles have included the maintenance of oppositional political 
discourses during the Milosevic era in Serbian politics; the watchdog/monitoring role 
over key areas of reform; the role of a dialogue partner of the Serbian Government on 
various topics regarding EU accession; the EU advocacy role, the role of an advocate 
for better protection of human and minority rights, better neighbourly relations and 
media freedoms. Pro-EU civil society associations acted as the main bridge of 
communication and contact between Serbian society at large and EU institutions 
during the times of the country’s international isolation, sanctions and economic 





developed between the main EU institutions and Serbian NGOs during that era have 
been the foundation for further development of Serbia’s non-government sector and 
deeper intra-civil society cooperation, including on projects with high visibility such as 
the Belgrade Security Forum, the Igman Initiative and the LGBT human rights watch 
network that was set up by Labris and similar organisations.  
This paper used illustrative case studies of specific NGO activities to highlight some of 
civil society’s achievements in Serbia’s EU accession process. In February 2018, the 
European Commission published a roadmap for further enlargement and a possible 
inclusion year for new members – 2025 (see Petrovic’s Introduction to this issue). The 
Commission specifically mentioned civil society as part of the political, economic and 
social transformation of the Western Balkans (European Commission, 2018b). Viable, 
protected and independent civil society is vitally important for Serbia’s accession 
process to continue, and for Serbia to join the EU family in the foreseeable future.  
However, significant obstacles to the work of civil society in Serbia remain. Key 
challenges include the long-term viability of funding, protection from anti-democratic 
forces and the need to preserve independence in civil society’s work vis-à-vis all other 
actors, as well as donors which include the Serbian Government. Civil society can only 
act as a counter-force to populist groups and narratives in Serbia if its activists are 
operating in a safe space where their freedom of speech is upheld in both theory and 
practice. One of the major tasks for pro-EU civil society in Serbia is to continue with 
its EU advocacy efforts, as public opinion globally and in Serbia too has turned more 
Eurosceptic. For a country that is still undergoing transformation and that has 
progressed enormously from being Europe’s pariah in the 1990s to an open and 
progressive democratic state by 2018 (despite many ongoing challenges which all post-
Communist countries face to one degree or another) it is imperative to continue to 
recognise, support and protect the work of Serbian civil society as a precondition for 
both democracy and EU membership.   
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